Harri Jalonen
01.12.2021

Democracy is coupled with the idea of universal suffrage. Depending on the election, suffrage is either based on citizenship or place of residence. The right to vote does not require citizens to be informed on the matters raised by the candidates. This is not considered particularly problematic, as public discourse is much more concerned with the level of turnout. The less people exercise their right to vote, the more fragile the legitimacy of democracy is considered. We are used to considering democracy as an inherently better form of governance than autocracy. Autocrats have proven Sir John Dahlberg-Action’s (1834-1902) wisdom true: “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”.

There are many shades of grey between democracy and autocracy, such as epistocracy known as the “aristocracy of the wise”. In an epistocracy, power is given to those who have most knowledge and competency to assess the consequences of political decision-making. The elitist sounding idea starts to become more understandable when moved from the field of politics into the context of, for instance, healthcare: which one of us would not rather choose to be tended by an educated medical professional than by a self-taught healer.

However, comparing a medically trained professional to a “knowing” political decision-maker is a simplification of reality. This is due to the fact that a doctor’s decisions are based on knowledge cumulated from medical research, whereas political decision-making, besides being based on “knowing”, is also always an allocation of values. What is considered ‘good’ politics, is under constant debate. Basing suffrage on an individual’s cognitive competence might work in theory, but not in practice. Giuseppina Ronzitti and Tero Tulenheimo, for example, remind us in their Kanava-magazine article (7/2021), that although it would serve us better for decisions to be based more on evidence than in (dis)beliefs, epistocracy must be rejected as a form of government because of the difficulties involved.

The fact that cognitive competence does not result in the right to vote, is not to say that information is irrelevant in political decision-making. Instead of epistocracy, the power of the sages is seen behind the scenes and in the media. Available information is not only crucial in shaping the content of decisions, but also in legitimising value-based views.

Those that prepare and make decision are major consumers of information. The more wicked the problem, the likelier that researchers or other experts are turned to for help. Different lobbyists are also eager to provide the counsel of the parties they represent to support decision-makers in their task.

Decision-makers both in Finland and globally were faced with something new in the beginning of the year 2020. The rapidly evolving crisis, which turned into a pandemic, required major decision to be taken without knowledge of their effectiveness. Speculations about the spreading mechanism of the virus, the measures taken to treat those that caught it, as well as the consequences of restrictive measures were floating around. One expert after the other stirred the pot by offering their opinions on the matter, whilst self-taught epidemiologists educated us (often in retrospect) on what should have been done.

The Covid-19-pandemic offers an interesting glimpse into the back and forth between evidence and values in political decision-making. In the UK, for example, SAGE-group (Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies) that advices the central government, has normally been relied on during emergencies. The group, consisting of top experts within their various fields, has enjoyed widespread trust and its advice often influence the decision-making of the incumbent government.

In lieu of the aforementioned, it is interesting to read the article by iSAGE (Independent Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies), largely seen as the competitor of SAGE, in the British Medical Journal. The group, that has been named strangely similarly to its role model, highlights independence in its operations. Despite having every right to do so, this should not be interpreted as though the original SAGE-group would somehow have sacrificed its independence. This interpretation is further contradicted by the fact that SAGE has proposed many measures during the corona pandemic, which have been rejected by the government of Prime Minister Boris Johnson on the basis of political discretion.

iSAGE too, consists of accredited researchers and it aims to provide scientifically valid and impartial information. According to the group itself, its views on the societal importance of scientific knowledge do not fundamentally differ from SAGE’s point of view. It is therefore not surprising, that the group has become the central actor in distributing corona related news in the UK. Besides providing scientific advice to decision-makers, iSage, unlike SAGE, also seeks to influence public opinion. Despite scientific knowledge being at the core of both groups’ operations, where the original SAGE acknowledge and accept the uncertainty related to scientific knowledge, iSAGE views this uncertainty as problematic, as it is seen to weaken the effectiveness of scientific communications. The differences between the two groups are summed up in that SAGE refrains from giving absolute advice, in case the evidence turns out to be ambiguous, whereas for iSAGE the end justifies the means and ambiguity is seen as white noise that should not prevent ‘good’ advice from being given.

It is understandable that clear solutions are expected in tough situations. Science, just as any other man-made institution, is imperfect. The quick development of the corona-vaccines however stands to show that the system is working. The cumulation of scientific knowledge is sometimes arduously slow, but still guarantees the most sustainable recipe for dealing with big societal challenges. Despite its shortcomings, science is a system that truly strives to be self-correcting.

Fortunately, a lot has been done in Finland in recent years to promote knowledge-based decision-making, for example by strengthening co-operation between information producers and decision-makers. It is an eternal process, because as knowledge increases, so too does our curiosity.

In decision-making, politicians still always have the final word. They have democratically been elected to ponder over the bases and consequences of decisions. How ‘good’ the taken decisions end up being, is not decided in the ivory towers of researchers (not that I know a single researcher working in one), but in public discourse. Smart decision-makers subject themselves to scientific knowledge and use it in ‘the art of the possible’. We, the electorate, also bear a responsibility; it matters whether we vote for candidates that seek to understand what science has to say, or for those that provide answers without actual insight as to what is really going on.

Harri Jalonen, Professor, University of Vaasa